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Abstract
Emergency supplies are of great importance when coping with a disaster. The
stockpiling and production of emergency supplies should depend on private
manufacturers in some cases, and the government will oﬀer the manufacturer a
subsidy to encourage its investment on extra reserves. This study investigates the
manufacturer’s optimal decision on reserve investment and the government’s
optimal subsidy policy based on mathematical models. The results indicate that to
gain maximum beneﬁt, the manufacturer should allocate its funds on both physical
material reserve and production capacity reserve according to the government’s
subsidy policy, while the government should take note of the relation between
subsidy policy and subsidy period to ensure the manufacturer’s provision level of
emergency supplies.
Keywords: emergencies; physical material reserves; production capacity reserves;
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1 Introduction
Reserves of emergency goods and production capacity play an important role in disas-
ter relief and mitigation. Yet, only the ability of the government is not enough to provide
suﬃcient emergency supplies to numerous victims in a large-scale disaster or bioterror-
ism event. Some attempts have been made to involve private companies in emergency
preparedness by making them aware that they have vested interests in the impact area
through customers, suppliers, and corporate values of social responsibility. Nevertheless,
a private company maintains a level of inventory on purpose of producing certain range
of products and services. A humanitarian inventory often goes beyond the private sec-
tor’s regular operation of producing in the most eﬃcient and economical manner. Thus,
the private business is unlikely to respond to the mobilization of emergency reserves if
the government did not give them certain subsidies. In practice, the government usually
negotiates a contract with related manufacturers on the emergency reserve schemes in
terms of categories and quantities of items, price, subsidies, etc. However, little is known
regarding the reasonable subsidy policy and manufacturers’ optimal reserve investment
in disaster preparedness. Therefore, this study addresses the following speciﬁc research
questions by the application of inequalities in optimization:
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() Given the government’s subsidy policy for private emergency reserves of physical
materials and production capacity, how should the manufacturer make the optimal in-
vestment decision?
() How should the government determine optimal subsidy policy in order to ensure the
manufacturer’s provision level of emergency supplies?
2 Literature review
Emergency preparedness is crucially important to eliminate or reduce the damage caused
by disasters (Natarajarathinam et al. []). The emergency-management-related activities
traditionally belong to the domain and responsibility of local, state, and federal govern-
ments (Lettieri et al. []; Wilson and Oyola-Yemaiel []). People around the world expect
their governments to have resources to respond to disasters in a timely and eﬀective fash-
ion. However, numerous natural and man-made disasters over the past decade, such as
hurricanes, terrorist attacks, tornadoes, ﬂoods, mudslides, and oil/chemical spills, have
highlighted the challenge of crafting appropriate response capabilities and interagency
procedures for even themost well-resourced nations (Hense et al. []). Moreover, in some
cases, governmental entities failed in the emergency management function (Edwards []),
resulting in the increased importance of corporations.
Corporations often occupy an important social space in the provision of resources, ad-
ministrative eﬃciency, and contacts to address the eﬀects of disasters (Johnson et al. []).
Stewart et al. [] believed that private sector companies can respond both eﬃciently and
eﬀectively to the needs of impacted areas and receiving communities. Actually, the federal
government of the United States has recognized that the resources and skills that private
corporations possess are needed in times of disaster (Johnson et al. []). Hence there is
the need to involve private industry in the strategy to boost performance for disaster man-
agement (Fitzgerald []; Cohen []). In view of the current mandates by governments to
improve the eﬃcacy of disaster response and preparedness eﬀorts, corporate involvement
in disaster-related activities has become a topic for academic research (Johnson et al. []).
Chen and Huang [] noted that government should utilize the power of society fully
and establish a complete system of emergency relief reserves to meet the relief demands.
Hutchison [] has recommended partnerships between governments and the private sec-
tor in prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery eﬀorts to reinvigorate local eco-
nomics and their resilience toward future disasters. Giving the private sector asmuch free-
dom as possible to provide resources for relief and recovery eﬀorts and ensure that its role
is oﬃcially acknowledged as part of emergency protocols was suggested (Horwitz []).
However, current research in the domain of public-private partnerships does not ad-
equately address the diversity of interaction that is needed to facilitate higher levels of
resilience in the wake of a disaster (Stewart et al. []). When considering the fact that dis-
asters can overwhelm governmental response eﬀorts (Wise andNader []; Edwards []),
a more explicit understanding of what corporations do in the context of disasters may
continue to grow in importance (Johnson et al. []). In emergency management systems,
a private sector should have more opportunity and responsibility to provide resources for
response and recovery operations (Unlu et al. []). Chen and Huang [] indicated that
the emergency supplies reserve strategy in the form of ex-ante government and enterprise
co-reserve is superior to the strategy in the form of ex-post emergency procurement and
emergency production with fund limitation and high social cost.
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Governments and manufacturers that produce batteries, generators, and other supplies
and equipment needed in times of crises must determine appropriate stock levels to sup-
port a potential initial response operation (Lodree Jr. and Taskin []) since holding large
amounts of inventory is impractical due to high demand uncertainty, highly variable pro-
duction times, and high holding costs. In particular, a certain amount of spare production
capacity should be reserved to meet continuous demand, once emergency demand ex-
ceeds on-hand inventory. Li et al. [] indicated that production capacity reserve is useful
for the resourceswhose ordinary consumption is small in peacetime but demand is large in
emergency. Nevertheless, disasters are so uncertain that many manufacturers tend to un-
derestimate emergency demand in order to gainmore proﬁts in peacetime. In otherwords,
it is unreasonable for manufacturers to take the risks of proﬁt loss by themselves without
any incentive from the government while executing emergency reserves. Therefore, the
current study will attempt to address this problem by designing a win-win strategy which
can increase a relevant manufacturers’ desire to participate in reserve work for emergency
resources.
3 Model description and analysis
() In a next period T , the government will give subsidy to the manufacturer for its re-
serves of physical materials and production capacity in case of an emergency event. The
government’s subsidy policy is reﬂected by δ and δ. The governmentwill grant themanu-
facturer subsidies for a proportion (δ) in its total emergency reserve of physical materials
and for a proportion (δ) in its total emergency reserve of production capacity.
() When t = , the manufacturer plans to use certain capital (set to one for simplicity)
to build up emergency reserves for physical materials and production capacity, and allo-
cates the capital to physical material and production capacity reserve building in a rate
of η to  – η ( < η < ). W and W denote the potential maximums of physical material
and production capacity reserves. θW and θW denote the manufacturer’s current (i.e.,
t = ) reserves of physical materials and production capacity.
() Let x and y be the manufacturer’s reserves of physical materials and production ca-
pacity at time t, respectively. Due to the manufacturer’s low reserve at t = , we assume
that the physical material and production capacity reserves increase in the period T , but
the increase speed is declining over time. Thus, the increasingmodel of themanufacturer’s
reserves of physical materials and production capacity is
⎧⎨
⎩dx/dt = αη(W – x),dy/dt = β( – η)(W – y), ()
where α and β denote the manufacturer’s ability in building reserves of physical materials
and production capacity, respectively.
() We assume δ, δ ∈ (, ), W <W, α > β , and θ > θ. δ, δ ∈ (, ) denotes that the
government gives subsidies for a proportion out of the total emergency reserves of phys-
ical materials and production capacity. This is because if the government provides full
subsidies, the manufacturer may limitlessly expand the reserves. W <W shows that the
manufacturer hasmore expandable room for production capacity. Tomeet the large num-
ber of orders as well as reduce storage, many manufacturers can have ﬂexible standby ma-
chines capable of performing operation in addition to the main production line, thus the
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potential maximum of production capacity is supposed to be larger than that of physical
material storage. α > β denotes that for amanufacturer the ability in building physical ma-
terial reserve is higher than in building production capacity reserve. Finally, because the
expandable room for production capacity is much bigger, we assume that the proportion
of manufacturer’s reserve of physical materials at t =  in the potential maximum of phys-
ical material reserve is larger than the proportion of manufacturer’s reserve of production
capacity at t =  in the potential maximum of production capacity reserve, namely, θ > θ.
3.1 Manufacturer’s optimal decision
As x–θW and y–θW are the increase in amanufacturer’s reserves of physicalmaterials
and production capacity at time t, and δ and δ are government subsidy on them, δ(x –
θW) and δ(y – θW) are the beneﬁt that a manufacturer gains from the emergency
reserves of physical materials and production capacity. Therefore, the expected beneﬁt





δ(x – θW) + δ(y – θW)
]
dt. ()
Themanufacturer needs to determine the investment rate η for the two types of reserves
in the hope of maximizing E(η). According to the initial condition (t = ), we solve Eq. ()
and obtain the following set of equalities:
⎧⎨
⎩x =W + (θ – )We
–αηt ,
y =W + (θ – )We–β(–η)t .
()
















δW( – θ) + δW( – θ)
]
T – δW( – θ)( – e
–αηT )
αη
– δW( – θ)( – e
–β(–η)T )
β( – η) . ()
Proposition  If the subsidy period T is long enough, for the government’s any subsidy
policy δ/δ, there is only one optimal decision η∗ ∈ (, ), which makes the manufacturer’s
expected beneﬁt E(η) maximum. If the subsidy period T is short, the government should
select an appropriate subsidy policy δ/δ to ensure that the manufacturer has the optimal
decision η∗ ∈ (, ).
Proof Let the subsidy policy of the government be δ/δ. Accordingly, the manufacturer




= –Wδ( – θ)
α
· (ηαT + )e
–αηT – 
η
+ δW( – θ)
β
· [( – η)βT + ]e
–β(–η)T – 
( – η) . ()
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When the manufacturer comes to its optimal decision, there exists η∗ ∈ (, ) which
makes ∂E/∂η∗ = . Based on the zero-point theorem, if limη→+ ∂E(η)/∂η >  and























= Wδ( – θ)
α
· e







< Wδ( – θ)
α
– δW( – θ)βT

 . ()
According to Eq. (), if W(–θ)δαT –
(–θ)δW
β




to Eq. (), if Wδ(–θ)
α
– (–θ)δWβT ≤ , then T ≥
√
Wδ(–θ)
Wδαβ(–θ) . As a consequence, if
T ≥ T, we have
δ
δ





Otherwise, if T < T, we have
δ
δ
> W( – θ)W( – θ)





The two conditions described by Eq. () and Eq. () can ensure that the manufacturer
has the optimal decision. 
When the subsidy period T is ﬁxed, if the government adjusts subsidy policy to make














According to Eq. () and Eq. (), if the subsidy period T satisﬁes Eq. () and Eq. (), or















< Wδ( – θ)
α
– Wδ( – θ)βT

 ≤ . ()
We compute the partial derivative of Eq. () with respect to η and have
∂E(η)
∂η
= –Wδ( – θ)
β
· e
β(–η)T – [βT( – η)] – βT( – η) – 
( – η)eβ(–η)T
– Wδ( – θ)
α
· e
αηT – (ηαT) – ηαT – 
βeαηT . ()
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h –  > . ()
Given f () =  and the condition in Eq. (), f (h) is equal to or greater than zero. Thus
⎧⎨
⎩e
αηT – (ηαT) – ηαT –  > ,
eβ(–η)T – [βT( – η)] – βT( – η) –  > .
()
According to Eq. () and Eq. (), ∂E(η)/∂η < . ∂E(η)/∂η is therefore a decreasing
function of η on the interval (, ). In other words, there exists at most one η⊗ ∈ (, ) that
satisﬁes ∂E(η)/∂η|η=η⊗ = . Given Eq. () and Eq. () as well as the deﬁnition of extreme
value, E(η) has and only has one extreme value, i.e., η∗ = η⊗ and E(η∗) > E(η), η = η∗.
The above analysis indicates that, given the government’s subsidy policy δ/δ, if the sub-
sidy period T is long enough, there must exist only one optimal decision η∗ ∈ (, ) which
makes themanufacturer’s expected beneﬁt E(η) maximum. In other words, nomatter how
the government provides subsidies for the manufacturer’s reserves of physical materials
and production capacity, as long as the subsidy period T is long, the manufacturer has
an optimal decision η∗ ∈ (, ). When the subsidy period T is short, through the adjust-
ment of δ/δ, the government can still make the manufacturer invest on the reserves of
both physical materials and production capacity as an optimal decision. However, when
the subsidy period T is short and the subsidy policy δ/δ is not reasonable, the manu-
facturer’s optimal decision would be η∗ =  or η∗ = . This means that the manufacturer’s
optimal decision is to reserve one aspect, physical materials or production capacity, which
obviously would be to the detriment of the provision of emergency supplies.
3.2 Government’s optimal decision
The requirements of emergency supplies can be divided into two stages: beginning re-
quirement stage and persistent requirement stage. In the beginning stage of an emergency,
because the production process of goods such as tents and pharmaceuticals need time, the
manufacturer mainly relies on the preserved physical materials. However, the preserved
materialsmay notmeet a durative demand. Then, the preserved production capacity could
make sustaining provision of emergency supplies. Thus, provision level of emergency sup-
plies is guaranteed through the reserves of both physical materials and production capac-
ity. Let z denote the manufacturer’s provision level of supplies in case of an emergency
event and z, being a low level, denote the initial provision level at t = . We assume that
the provision level in the period T is related to the investment on physical materials and
production capacity which is determined by investment rate η. Thus, the change of pro-
vision level over time can be written as
dz/dt = zηγ ( – η)–γ , ()
where r is the elasticity coeﬃcient of η. The total level of provision is the sum of provision
level at each time point in the period T , and the total level of provision therefore can be
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Proposition  If the manufacturer’s optimal decision η⊕ equals γ , to make the total level
of provision of emergency supplies Z maximum, the government’s optimal subsidy policy
δ∗ /δ∗ should be an increasing function of the subsidy period T .
Proof Given the initial provision level z, we solve the nonlinear diﬀerential equation ()
and obtain
z = zetη
γ (–η)–γ . ()





γ (–η)–γ dt. ()
Let h(η) = ηγ ( – η)–γ . We have dh(η)/dη = γ (γ – )ηγ–( – η)–γ– < . Thus, h(η)
must have a maximum value. It then follows that
dh(η)/dη = γ ηγ–( – η)–γ – ηγ ( – γ )( – η)–γ = . ()
According to Eq. (), η has a unique solution η⊕ = γ on the interval (, ), whichmakes
h(η) attain amaximum. If the government knows γ , it can adjust the subsidy policy δ/δ to
make themanufacturer attain the optimal decision η⊕ = γ . Meanwhile, the total provision
level of emergency supplies Z also attains its maximum value. The optimal policy of the
government can be obtained by substituting η⊕ = γ into ∂E/∂η = . That is,
δ∗
δ∗
= Wα( – θ)
βW( – θ)
· γ
([( – γ )βT + ]e–β(–γ )T – )
( – γ )((γαT + )e–αγT – ) . ()
When the government determines δ∗ /δ∗ as Eq. (), the manufacturer can maximize its
expected beneﬁt by investing on the reserves of physicalmaterials and production capacity
in a rate of η⊕ to  – η⊕, where η⊕ = γ .
Given g = δ∗ /δ∗ , we calculate the partial derivative of g with respect to T and obtain
∂g
∂T = –
Wαγ ( – θ)
Wβ( – γ )( – θ)
×
( ( – γ )βTe–(–γ )βT
( + γαT)e–γ αT –  +
([( – γ )βT + ]e–(–γ )βT – )γ αTe–γ αT
[( + γαT)e–γ αT – ]
)
. ()
If w(h) = he–h + e–h – , then ∂w/∂h = –he–h <  and w(h) < w() = . It then follows that
⎧⎨
⎩[( – γ )βT + ]e
–(–γ )βT –  < ,
( + γαT)e–γ αT –  < .
()
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Inserting Eq. () in Eq. (), we ﬁnd ∂g/∂T > . This means that, when the subsidy
period T is relatively longer, the government should place more emphasis on subsidy of
physical material reserve (δ∗ ) to make the manufacturer attain its optimal decision which
satisﬁes η⊕ = γ , and thereby maximizing the total provision level of emergency supplies.

4 Numerical example and simulation
Let the manufacturer’s ability in building reserves of physical materials and production
capacity be α = . and β = .. The potential maximum of physical material and produc-
tion capacity reserves are W =  and W = , respectively. The manufacturer’s reserves
of physical materials and production capacity are . and  when t = , i.e., θ = . and
θ = .. The government hopes that the manufacturer would invest on reserves of both
physical materials and production capacity. The government determines γ = . based on
past experiences. According to Eq. () and Eq. (), we analyze two conditions: δ/δ ≤ /
and δ/δ > /, and use Figure  and Figure  to illustrate the relationships between δ and
the subsidy period T for the two conditions, with δ = {., ., ., ., .}.
As shown in Figure , when δ/δ ≤ / and the subsidy period T falling in the upper left
region of the curves, themanufacturer will reach the optimal decision thatmakes its bene-
ﬁt maximum.When δ/δ > / and the subsidy period T falling in the lower left region of
the curves, themanufacturer will also reach the optimal decision (see Figure ).Moreover,
these two ranges of T can satisfy the government’s demand for the strategic reserves of
Figure 1 The relationships between δ2 and T
with δ1/δ2 ≤ 5/3. The curves from left to right
denote δ1 = {0.3, 0.1, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
Figure 2 The relationships between δ2 and T
with δ1/δ2 > 5/3. The curves from left to right
denote δ1 = {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
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Figure 3 The region of (δ1/δ2,T) satisfying
η ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 4 The relationship between δ∗1/δ
∗
2 and T
when η = γ .
both physical materials and production capacity. That is, the manufacturer’s optimal de-
cision is not to invest on only one aspect (physical material reserve or production capacity
reserve).
By substituting the values of α, β , W, W, θ, and θ into Eq. (), we have /(T) <
δ/δ < T/ and T >
√
. Figure  illustrates the corresponding region of (δ/δ,T) that
satisﬁes η ∈ (, ). As long as the government’s subsidy policy δ/δ and subsidy period
T simultaneously fall in the region between the two curves, it can be sure that the man-
ufacturer will reach the optimal decision with η on the interval (, ). According to the
analysis of the government’s optimal decision, when the manufacturer has taken its opti-
mal decision η = γ (γ is set to . in this example), the government can adjust the subsidy
policy δ/δ to obtain the highest provision level of emergency supplies. The relationships
between the government’s optimal subsidy policy δ∗ /δ∗ and subsidy period T are given
in Figure . In other words, once the subsidy period or subsidy policy is ﬁxed, there ex-
ists only one subsidy policy or subsidy period which attains the highest provision level of
emergency supplies.
5 Conclusion
Catastrophic events such as natural andman-made disasters are typically characterized by
a low probability of occurrence and a signiﬁcant demand surge for supplies and equipment
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(Lodree Jr. and Taskin []). If a disaster occurs and emergency preparedness for relief ma-
terials is inadequate, then social and economic consequences can be catastrophic. Many
scholars suggested that the government is obligated to seek assistances from manufac-
tures. However, a manufacturer invests on the reserves of physical materials and produc-
tion capacity based on market demand, and is often reluctant to prepare for the potential
needs caused by various emergency events. Thus, it is important for the government to
provide support for a manufacturer’s reserves of relief materials and production capac-
ity in case of a disaster. By formulating an incentive strategy to involve manufactures in
emergency preparedness, this study extends the application of inequalities in the domain
of emergency preparedness.
We found that to gain maximum beneﬁt, the manufacturer should allocate its funds on
both physical material reserve and production capacity reserve according to the govern-
ment’s subsidy policy, and that the government should attach importance to the relation-
ship between subsidy policy and subsidy period to enhance the manufacturer’s provision
level of emergency supplies. To a large extent, successful emergency reserve relies on coop-
eration between the government and manufacturers. The government should encourage
the manufacturers to allocate investment on extra reserves through reasonable subsidies.
The mathematical models introduced in this study can make the capacities of the govern-
ment and the manufacture pace in the same or in almost similar directions.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
ZZ ﬁnished the proof and the writing work. XL gave ZZ some advice on paper revision. Both authors read and approved
the ﬁnal manuscript.
Authors’ information
Zili Zhang, Ph.D., is a lecturer at School of Management at Harbin Institute of Technology, China. Xiangyang Li is a
professor at School of Management at Harbin Institute of Technology, China.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for providing constructive comments on the earlier versions of
this paper. This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (91024028, 91024031).
Received: 12 October 2012 Accepted: 30 January 2013 Published: 20 February 2013
References
1. Natarajarathinam, M, Capar, I, Narayanan, A: Managing supply chains in times of crisis: a review of literature and
insights. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 39, 535-573 (2009)
2. Lettieri, E, Masella, C, Radaelli, G: Disaster management: ﬁndings from a systematic review. Disaster Prev. Manag. 18,
117-136 (2009)
3. Wilson, J, Oyola-Yemaiel, A: The evolution of emergency management and advancement towards a profession in the
United States and Florida. Saf. Sci. 39, 117-131 (2001)
4. Hense, KA, Wyler, BD, Kaufmann, G: Preparedness versus reactiveness: an approach to pre-crisis disaster planning.
J. Homel. Secur. Emerg. Manag. 7, Article ID 58 (2010)
5. Edwards, FL: Recovering from Katrina: a work in progress - 2007. Public Manag. 36, 67-72 (2007/2008)
6. Johnson, BR, Connolly, E, Carter, TS: Corporate social responsibility: the role of fortune 100 companies in domestic
and international natural disasters. Corp. Soc.-Responsib. Environ. Manag. 18, 352-369 (2011)
7. Stewart, GT, Kolluru, R, Smith, M: Leveraging public-private partnerships to improve community resilience in times of
disaster. Int. J. Phys. Distrib. Logist. Manag. 39, 343-364 (2009)
8. Fitzgerald, ME: The emergency response plan: key to compliance with the emergency response provisions of the
hazardous waste operations and emergency response standard (29 CFR 1910.120). Appl. Occup. Environ. Hyg. 11,
1154-1162 (1996)
9. Cohen, MJ: State-level emergency response to the September 11 incidents: the role of New Jersey’s Department of
Environmental Protection. J. Conting. Crisis Manag. 11, 78-85 (2003)
10. Chen, T, Huang, J: Exploratory research on the system of China relief reserve. Syst. Eng. Proced. 5, 99-106 (2012)
11. Hutchison, D: Lessons learned in dealing with large-scaled disasters. Insur. Risk Manag. 73, 79-88 (2005)
12. Horwitz, S: Making hurricane response more eﬀective: lessons learned from the private sector and coast guard
during Katrina. http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Publications/PDF_20080319_
MakingHurricaneReponseEﬀective.pdf (2008). Accessed 28 Nov 2012
Zhang and Li Journal of Inequalities and Applications 2013, 2013:62 Page 11 of 11
http://www.journaloﬁnequalitiesandapplications.com/content/2013/1/62
13. Wise, CR, Nader, R: Organizing the federal system for homeland security: problems, issues, and dilemmas. Public Adm.
Rev. 62, 44-57 (2002)
14. Edwards, FL: Federal intervention in local emergency planning: nightmare on main street. State Local Gov. Rev. 39,
31-43 (2007)
15. Unlu, A, Kapucu, N, Sahin, B: Disaster and crisis management in Turkey: a need for a uniﬁed crisis management
system. Disaster Prev. Manag. 19, 155-174 (2010)
16. Lodree, EJ Jr., Taskin, S: An insurance risk management framework for disaster relief and supply chain disruption
inventory planning. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 59, 674-684 (2008)
17. Li, H, He, J, Zhu, X: Multi-formal and information-based emergency resource reserve system in China. Chin. J. Popul.
Resour. Environ. 6, 52-58 (2008)
doi:10.1186/1029-242X-2013-62
Cite this article as: Zhang and Li: The optimal manufacturer’s reserve investment and government’s subsidy policy
in emergency preparedness. Journal of Inequalities and Applications 2013 2013:62.
